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___________________________________________________________
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___________________________________________________________
________________________
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________________________

DERRICK BELL
Counsel for Respondents
New York University School of Law
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012

*
This brief incorporates material which originally appeared in an Essay by
Derrick Bell, published in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID:
THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS
DECISION (Jack M. Balkin & Bruce A. Ackerman eds., 2001).
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I.

SEEING THE LIGHT

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) upheld the constitutionality
of a statute requiring railroads carrying passengers to provide
separate but equal accommodations for white and colored races.
Respondents acknowledge that (1) during Reconstruction, Negro
leaders did much to establish public schools in the southern states
and, (2) along with much of the South, those school systems after
Reconstruction, and particularly after Plessy, were operated on a basis
that seriously under funded schools serving Negro children. The
school systems rigorously enforced the “separate” in the “separate but
equal” standard, but their treatment of “equal” has served as a total
refutation of equality. However, in varying degrees, states have come
to realize that they must make all schools separate and equal, in tardy
compliance with the Plessy standard. Additionally, many have already
made progress in equalization.
In recent years, this Court has acknowledged states’ flaunting of
the “separate but equal” standard at the graduate school level by
ordering Negro plaintiffs admittance into previously all-white
graduate programs. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637, 642 (1950) (holding that the plaintiff is entitled to the same
treatment as other students pursuing a doctorate in education, and
that by assigning the student to designated colored seats and rooms,
the school violated the petitioner’s rights to equal protection under
the law); see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950) (finding
that the educational opportunities offered to white and black
students at the University of Texas were not substantially equal,
therefore the petitioner should be admitted to the law school); Sipuel
v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 632 (1948) (compelling the University of
Oklahoma to admit petitioner to the law school of University of
Oklahoma because there were not similar facilities available for black
students); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938)
(requiring that the state of Missouri either furnish equal legal
education facilities for Negro students if the State offered legal
education facilities to white students or allow Negro students into the
legal facilities furnished for whites).
Encouraged by those decisions, Petitioners now urge that we
extend those holdings to encompass segregation in literally
thousands of public school districts. In support, the Petitioners’
counsel speaks eloquently of both the great disparities in resources,
and the damage segregation does to Negro children’s hearts and
minds. We recognize and do not wish to rebut petitioner’s evidence
of this psychological damage. Indeed, while Respondents have not
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submitted social science testimony, we submit that school segregation
causes harm to white children that, while different, is no less serious
in degree than that suffered by Negro children.
Given the acknowledgments set out above, Respondents will accept
specific court orders mandating the school equalization process.
However, Respondents are greatly concerned that relief Petitioners
seek, namely overturning the Plessy principle and ordering immediate
integration of the schools, will result in enormous pressures to
terminate the equalization process and frustrate compliance with any
effort to eliminate the dual school systems.
No less a personage than Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
acknowledged the limits of judicial authority when, speaking for the
Court in a 1903 voting rights case from Alabama, Giles v. Harris, 189
U.S. 475 (1903), he denied the relief sought by black voters. Justice
Holmes reasoned that if the white population intends to keep blacks
from voting, it would do little good to give black voters an order that
would be ignored at the local level. Id. at 488. “Apart from damages
to the individual,” Holmes explained, “relief from a great political
wrong, if done, as alleged by the people of a state and the state itself,
must be given by them or by the legislative and political department
of the Government of the United States.” Id.
II. THE ROOTS OF SEGREGATION ARE FAR DEEPER THAN PLESSY V.
FERGUSON
We agree with Petitioners and the amicus briefs filed by the United
States government that reversing the Plessy decision would greatly
serve the Nation’s foreign policy and domestic concerns. However,
Respondents believe it would provide Petitioners with no more than a
semblance of the racial equality that they and theirs have sought for
so long.
The harm Petitioners allege they have suffered as a result of racial
segregation can be neither understood nor redressed effectively
without comprehension of the economic, political, and psychological
advantages whites gained because of that harm. As suggested
previously, this comprehension must also recognize that whites may
have been harmed by racial segregation. The presence of an
officially-designated out group (the African slave and the segregated
Negro) gives whites a false sense of their superior status, one that
blinds them to an economic and political status that, save for color,
renders them only marginally better off than the Negroes.
Plessy is viewed by Petitioners as the constitutional justification for
segregated schools. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (justifying the statute
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ordering segregated accommodations in railways cars by discussing
the judicial and legislative approval of segregated educational
facilities). However, Plessy is only fortuitously a legal precedent. In
actuality, it is a judicial affirmation of an unwritten, but no less clearly
understood, social compact based on a belief in white superiority that
has been incorporated into the Constitution and continually
affirmed. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857)(stating that
Negros “had no rights the white man was bound to respect”).
Any decision overturning Plessy will be viewed as a triumph by
Negro Petitioners and the class they represent. However, without
recognizing and attempting to dismantle the racial compact, in
particular the indirect and misleading promises made to whites and
the opportunities surrendered by whites to gain racial privileges, a
decision overturning Plessy will be condemned by many whites as a
breach of the racial compact. The expected outrage and resistance
by whites will undermine and eventually negate even the most
committed judicial enforcement efforts. Thus, within the limits of
judicial authority, the Court should view these cases as an opportunity
to lay bare the simplistic hypocrisy of the “separate but equal”
standard, not as Petitioners urge by overturning Plessy, but by
ordering its strict enforcement.
Respondents urge that equating the constitutional and educational
harm, without cognizance of the sources of that harm, will worsen the
plight of black children for decades to come. It will also perpetuate
white children’s belief that their privileged status as whites is deserved
in fact rather than granted by law and tradition. Racial segregation
afflicts white children with a life-long mental and emotional handicap
that is as destructive to whites as the required strictures of segregation
are damaging to Negroes.
In summary, Respondents reiterate that the decisions of this Court
affirming the constitutionality of segregation have been heavily relied
on by the states. See Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education,
175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (declining to overrule the separate but
equal doctrine); see also Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (reiterating the
constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine); Tyler v. Harmon,
104 So. 200, 203 (La. 1925) (reasoning that the Plessy decision
prohibited a court from declaring an ordinance providing
segregation of residences of blacks and whites unconstitutional). A
ruling in these cases that state supported racial segregation is now an
obsolete artifact of a by-gone age, one that no longer conforms to the
Constitution, will set the stage not for compliance, but for levels of
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defiance that will prove the antithesis of the equal educational
opportunity the Petitioners’ seek.
III. THE EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGE
The desegregation of public schools is a special matter, the
complexity of which is not adequately addressed in the Petitioners’
arguments. In urging this Court to strike down state-mandated
segregation, the Petitioners ignore the admonishment of W.E.B. Du
Bois, one of the Nation’s finest thinkers. Commenting on the
separate school, integrated school debate in 1933, Dr. Du Bois
observed that “Negro children needed neither segregated schools
nor mixed schools. What they need is education.” W.E.B. Du Bois,
Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335 (1935),
available at http://www.jstor.org/journals/jne.html.
Respondents are aware that despite the tremendous barriers to
good schools posed by the Plessy “separate but equal” standard, some
Negro schools through great and dedicated efforts by teachers and
parents achieved academic distinction. Many of the most successful
blacks today are products of segregated schools and colleges. In
urging what they hope will be a brighter tomorrow, Petitioners need
not cast aside the miracles of achievement attained in the face of
monumental obstacles.
Again we turn to Dr. Du Bois, who wrestled with the issue two
decades ago of whether black children were better off in integrated
or in separate schools. Id. He wrote:
A mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with hostile
public opinion, and no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is
bad. A segregated school with ignorant placeholders, inadequate
equipment, poor salaries, and wretched housing, is equally bad.
Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more
natural basis for the education of all youth. It gives wider contacts;
it inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses the inferiority
complex. But other things seldom are equal, and in that case,
Sympathy, Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed
school can offer.

Id.
Respondents commend to this Court Dr. Du Bois’ wisdom. He is
right as an educational matter and as a legal matter, and his
admonition can be given meaning within the structure of the Plessy
holding. The three phases of relief that we will describe below focus
attention on what is needed presently by the children of both races.
It is the only way to avoid a generation or more of strife over an ideal
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that, while worthwhile, will not achieve the effective education
Petitioners’ children need. Further, the existing constitutional
standards, interpreted as Respondents urge, can provide the effective
education needed by the children.
While declaring racial segregation harmful to black children, the
Petitioners treat these policies as though they descended unwanted
from the skies and can now be mopped up like a heavy rainfall and
flushed away. The unhappy fact is that as the Nation’s racial history
makes clear, a great many white as well as Negro children have been
harmed by segregation. Requiring school systems to operate a
duplicate set of schools results in schools that are as educationally
inefficient as petitioner’s contend they are constitutionally deficient.
IV. A SUGGESTED COURT ORDER
Realistic rather than symbolic relief for segregated schools will
require a specific, judicially monitored plan designed primarily to
provide the educational equity long denied under the separate but
equal rhetoric. Respondents believe that this Court has the authority
to grant such relief under the precedent of Plessy. See Plessy, 163 U.S.
at 550 (describing the role of the court in securing equality of rights
and protection under the law). Therefore, as a primary step toward
what may eventually prompt the voluntary disestablishment of the
dual school system, Respondents urge this Court to order relief that
must be provided to all children in racially segregated districts in the
following components.
1. Equalization: Effective immediately on receipt of this Court’s
mandate, lower courts will order school officials of the respondent
school districts to:
(A) ascertain through appropriate measures the academic standing
of each school district as compared to nationwide norms for school
systems of comparable size and financial resources. This data,
gathered under the direction and supervision of the district courts,
will be published and made available to all patrons of the district;
(B) all schools within the district must be fully equalized in physical
facilities, teacher training, experience, and salary, with the goal of
each district, as a whole, measuring up to the norms as determined in
Section (A) above within three years;
(C) every year, school districts must provide a report to the Court
on the equalization progress as measured by resources, teacher-pupil
ratio, years of teacher training, teaching experience, and other
measures to be determined by the district courts.
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2.

Representation: The battle cry of those who fought and died
to bring this country into existence was “taxation without
representation is tyranny.” Effective relief in segregated school
districts requires the immediate restructuring of school boards and
other policy-making bodies to insure that those formally excluded by
race from representation have persons selected by them in
accordance with the percentage of their children in the school
system. This restructuring must take effect no later than the start of
the 1955-56 school year.
3. Judicial oversight: To effectuate the efficient implementation
of these orders, federal district judges will be instructed to set up
three-person monitoring committees with the Negro and white
communities each selecting one monitor. The selected monitors will
then agree on a third monitor. The monitoring committees will work
with school officials to prepare the necessary plans and procedures to
enable the school districts’ compliance with phases one and two. The
district courts will give compliance oversight priority attention and
will address firmly, through contempt orders and other similar
means, any actions intended to subvert or hinder the compliance
program.
Either party may appeal, on an accelerated basis,
compliance orders of the district court.
School districts that fail to move promptly to comply with the
equalization standards set out above should be deemed in noncompliance. Following a judicial determination of non-compliance,
courts can determine whether such non-compliance with the
“separate but equal” standard justifies relief similar to this Court’s
orders in the graduate school cases, including orders to promptly
desegregate their schools by racially balancing the students, faculty
and administrative populations in each school.
V. THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF SEGREGATION GOAL
Respondents suggest that the Petitioners’ goal of achieving a
disestablishment of the dual school system will be more effectively
achieved for all individuals connected directly or indirectly with the
school system by these means rather than by a ringing order for
immediate desegregation. Our expectations in this regard are
strengthened by the experience in the Delaware case, where school
officials unable to finance the equalization of separate schools, opted
to desegregate those schools. See Belton v. Gehart, 87 A.2d 862, 871
(1952) (ordering a white public school to admit black students).
Respondents recognize that the action we urge on this Court
neither comports with the Petitioners’ hopes for orders requiring
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immediate desegregation, nor the contentions of many in the South
that this Court should simply reject those petitions and retain the
racial status quo. Respondents urge that this Court’s goal should not
be to determine winners and losers. Rather, it is this Court’s
obligation to unravel the Nation’s greatest contradiction as it pertains
to the public schools.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy, perhaps unwittingly, articulated
this contradiction in definitive fashion when he observed:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in
wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all
time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution,
in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The existence of a dominant white race and the concept of colorblindness are polar opposites that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause cannot easily mediate. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause all too readily lends itself to
the staid formalisms that both “separate but equal” and “color
blindness” exemplify. The Clause’s formalist predilection should not
be too surprising. After all, equal protection generally seeks to
vindicate rights by evaluating the relationships between legally
authorized, if not manufactured, categories rather than squarely
addressing the validity of the state’s exercise of coercion against a
whole group.
In conclusion, Respondents do not ignore the value of simply
recognizing the evil of segregation, an evil Negroes have experienced
first-hand for too long. There is, we acknowledge, a place for symbols
in law for a people abandoned by law for much of the nation’s
history. We recognize and hail the impressive manner in which
Negroes have taken symbolic gains and given them meaning by the
sheer force of their beliefs. It is precisely because of their unstinting
faith in this country’s ideals that they deserve better than an
expression of benign paternalism, no matter how well intended. It
will serve as a sad substitute for the needed empathy of action called
for when a history of subordination of both races is to be undone.

